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Abstract 
 
  Since the end of the Cold War, the number of weak and failing states has 
increased significantly.  The United States (US) military has been deployed in multiple 
nation states in an effort to prevent these weak states from collapsing into chaos.  This 
thesis explores one of the driving factors of state collapse, net migration, to gauge how 
US foreign policy might be employed to reduce the flow of people out of a country.  To 
demonstrate the foreign policies and their effects, a pilot model was constructed using a 
system dynamics methodology.  The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was selected 
as a preliminary study for the model implementation. 
 This thesis examines three notional policies which could be implemented in the 
DRC: a reduction in the armed conflict occurring in the eastern provinces of the DRC, 
increasing the number of primary and secondary teachers in the DRC, and increasing the 
number of employment opportunities in the DRC.  Interactions between different factors 
and drivers of migration are analyzed and included in the system dynamics model.  
Several scenarios are tested using this model.  The results of these scenarios, as well as 
their implications for future policies, are detailed. 
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MIGRATION ISSUES IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction   
 
 
 With the creation of USAFRICOM on 1 Oct 2007 (US AFRICOM Public Affairs 
Office, 2010), the United States underscored that events taking place in Africa were of 
strategic importance.  The stated objectives of USAFRICOM include defeating Al-Qaeda 
and other terrorist organizations, halting transnational threats, countering the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and promoting a stable and secure Africa 
environment supportive of US policies (US AFRICOM Public Affairs Office, 2010).  A 
stable government is a key component of these objectives (Wyler, 2008, p. 1).  Policies 
and actions considered by the US should be evaluated a priori to determine how they will 
affect a particular nation’s stability. 
 One of the most difficult aspects of decision making is understanding the 
environment in which a decision will be made.  In the case of Africa, the relationships 
between tribes, vestiges of colonization, government bodies, insurgent forces, and 
international criminal organizations should be considered.  Additionally, economic 
activity and population movement are useful in evaluating regional susceptibility to 
insurgent and criminal activity (Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, & Brannan, 2001).  
Using a holistic view of the environment will help investigate secondary, tertiary, and 
further effects of actions taken. 
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 National Security Presidential Directive 44, issued by George W. Bush in 2005 
states: 
“The United States should work with other countries and organizations to 
anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and 
effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, [and] 
development” (Bush, 2005). 
 
 In support of this directive, this thesis examines the interactions between a 
nation’s economy, education level, and armed conflicts within its borders, as well as the 
effects they have on international net migration.  Additionally, it will examine the role 
US policies have on net migration.  As a preliminary study, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) was chosen due to the instability in the nation (The Failed States Index 
2010, 2010); multiple insurgent groups operate within its borders, there exists a high 
occurrence of violent crime and human rights abuse, and the struggle over strategic 
natural resources is intense.  To measure the effects of US policies on the stability of the 
DRC, a system dynamics model of the country was constructed.  This model enables the 
study of the interactions between the economy, education, armed conflict, migration, and 
the repercussions of US policy in the DRC. 
 System dynamics is a method used to uncover and represent dynamic interactions 
in complex systems, first introduced by Jay Forrester in Industrial Dynamics (1961).  
Using a system dynamics (SD) approach enables the investigation of not only of initial 
effects of an action, but will track the interactions of these effects as they cascade across the 
country and internationally.  It is important to note that the model proposed in Chapter III is 
designed specifically to model the net migration of the DRC.  While insights gained may be 
extended to other nations, the caution should be exercised should model results be used for 
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countries other than the DRC.  By using a SD modeling approach, models can be built that 
show the interactions and interdependencies of economics, education, insurgent activities, 
and transnational movement into and out of the DRC.   
This thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter II describes the current literature with 
respect to the importance and impact of nation stability, theories and factors of migration, 
the system dynamics methodology, and concludes with a brief history of the DRC and the 
current social and political situation in the country.  Chapter III describes the proposed 
SD model, gives a detailed description of its construction, and the manner in which 
different US policies were assessed.  Chapter IV provides the details of how the data was 
fitted and the results of regression.  Chapter V contains the results of the constructed 
model, along with an analysis of the results of a set of notional actions.  Chapter VI lays 
out the conclusions that can be drawn from the model and implications for the real world. 
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II.  Literature Review 
 
 
 This chapter will examine the characteristics of unstable nations along with the 
impact these unstable regions have on the surrounding area and the world.  After 
reviewing instability as a whole, a single factor of instability, migration, will be looked at 
in depth to determine its effectors, including the dynamic interactions of those effectors.  
The next section of the chapter studies the concept of system dynamics, a modeling 
technique that allows continuous, dynamic effects to be represented.  System dynamics 
will be used to construct a model of human migration related to the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC).  The final section of this chapter contains a brief history and overview 
of the DRC to provide an understanding of some of the cultural issues involved in 
modeling migration in the DRC. 
Nation Stability 
 In 2005, then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice wrote: 
 “The phenomenon of weak and failing states is not new, but the danger they now 
pose is unparalleled….Weak and failing states serve as global pathways that 
facilitate the spread of pandemics, the movement of criminals and terrorists, and 
the proliferation of the world's most dangerous weapons.” (Rice, 2005, p. B.07) 
 
 Additionally, failed states bring an increase in international drug and human 
trafficking and population displacement.  While these problems can occur in strong 
states, weak states lack the capability to contain and deal with the problems, which can 
allow them to spread (Baker, 2007).  Since the United States has a moral and strategic 
interest in preventing the problems that emanate from weak and failing states, it is in the 
US’s interest to pay particular attention to the stabilization of these regions when 
engaging in international politics. 
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 The difference between a failing state and a failed state is often a matter of time.   
Efforts should then be made to determine what a failed state did or did not do to change 
from a failing state to a failed one.  In essence, what did the nation fail to do?  Wyler 
states that a nation fails when it does not perform the functions of a government, which 
include providing peace and stability, effective governance, territorial control, and 
economic sustainability (Wyler, 2008).  Williamson defines a failing state as one which 
lacks a professional police force and an independent judiciary, has poor health care, and 
has unregulated commerce (Williamson, 2007, p. 13). Williams combines these failures 
into two overarching failures: 1) failure to control and 2) failure to promote human 
flourishing (Williams, 2007, p. 37).  He defines failure to control as being unable “to 
control actors and processes within a given territory,” and failure to promote human 
flourishing as failing to provide public goods to the entire population (Williams, 2007, 
pp. 37-38).  This thesis uses Williams’ definition of state failure, with a failing state being 
one that the central government  provides control and promotes human flourishing among 
friendly groups, but not hostile ones, and a failed state being one that cannot provide 
them for either friendly or hostile groups. 
 The classic example of a failed state is Somalia.  Without a functioning central 
government for nearly 20 years, Somalia has become a haven to insurgent and criminal 
forces.  Piracy, terrorists, poverty, slavery, and other human rights violations are 
prevalent throughout the country (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 
2006).  Increasing attention has been paid to Somalia recently as pirate raids from the 
country have increased, impacting international shipping and recreational sailing in the 
region.  Preventing attacks has been difficult due to the Somali government’s inability to 
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control its territory, while international law, the holding of hostages, and the prevention 
of non-combatant casualties impedes foreign warships from entering Somali territory to 
eradicate pirate havens.  Piracy in the Somali region is estimated to have cost the 
international community between 7 billion and 12 billion US dollars (Gill, 2011).  As 
evidenced from US actions during Operation RESTORE HOPE and the Battle of 
Mogadishu in the early 1990s, waiting until military action is required to prevent state 
collapse can be very costly, and not necessarily successful (Stewart, 2002).  From the 
example of Somalia, it is evident that preventing state failure is a key component of 
international peace. 
 Determining the root causes of a state’s failure is difficult at best and is generally 
different for each nation, but there are common themes that are prevalent.  Baker 
maintains that one cause is a legacy of unresolved inequities, including colonial rule, 
corrupt elites, and superpower involvement (Baker, 2007).  Williams summarizes the 
causes of state failure as a combination of bad leaders, predatory actors, bad economic 
policies, bad areas, and bad neighbors (Williams, 2007).  Iqbal and Starr found that states 
transitioning to or from a democracy were more prone to state failure, as well as states 
experiencing violent conflict (Iqbal & Starr, 2007).  The Fund for Peace uses twelve 
indicators to rate the criticality of state failure (The Failed States Index 2010, 2010).  
These are: 
1) Mounting Demographic Pressures 
2) Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons creating 
Complex Humanitarian Emergencies 
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3)  Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia 
4) Chronic and Sustained Human Flight 
5) Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines 
6) Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline 
7) Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State 
8) Progressive Deterioration of Public Services 
9) Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread 
Violation of Human Rights 
10) Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State" 
11) Rise of Factionalized Elites 
12) Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors  
While there are a number of indicators or causes of a state’s instability, this study focuses 
on the movement, or migration, of a nation’s populace across international borders.  It 
does not attempt to distinguish between forced migration and voluntary migration. 
 For the last several years, subject matter experts have come together to rank each 
nation on these criteria and judge the stability of that state.  These rankings are then 
published as the Failed States Index (The Failed States Index 2010, 2010).  A nation of 
particular interest is the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which had the fifth worst 
rating out of the 177 countries measured in 2010.  This ranking is even lower than both 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  There are several features in the DRC of interest to US foreign 
policy: it has multiple armed groups operating within its borders, large rates of violent 
crime, large regions of ungoverned territory, severe human rights violations, and the 
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pillaging of valuable natural resources, including Uranium.  A more in depth examination 
of the problems inherent in the DRC is conducted in a following section. 
Migration 
 Theories of Migration. 
 When looking at human migration patterns, it has been suggested that there are 
three general types of migration.  The first type is annual, or seasonal, migration.  This is 
exemplified by field laborers traveling across a nation or continent finding employment 
harvesting agricultural products (Reichert, 1981).  The second type is a forced migration, 
which occurs when people are unable to remain in their current region, despite their 
desires to remain.  This type of migration typically generates international refugees and 
internally displaced persons (Davenport, Moore, & Poe, 2003).  The third type of 
migration is a voluntary migration.  A voluntary migration includes the movement of 
people who initiate the move themselves, whether it is looking for better employment or 
a better situation for themselves and their families (Davenport, Moore, & Poe, 2003).  
Reuveny views these types of migration as a cost-benefit analysis (Reuveny, 2005), with 
people deciding to migrate because the benefit outweighs the cost involved.  It is 
important to understand the types of human migration in order to gain insight into why 
people do and do not migrate. 
 Since migration is an important factor of nation stability, it is helpful to know the 
causes of human migration so policies can be implemented that will counteract unwanted 
migration.  Oruc describes the two main motivators of migration as a result of economics 
and conflict (Oruc, 2009).  As the economic situation deteriorates in a region, people may 
desire to move elsewhere in an attempt to find a better financial situation for themselves 
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and/or their families, as exhibited in the United States during the migration out of the 
Dust Bowl during the Great Depression of the 1930s.  A similar movement is encouraged 
in an area of conflict as refugees flee the region in order to find safety and security.  
Reuveny adds that environmental deterioration is another cause and catalyst of internal 
and international migration (Reuveny, 2005).  Weather and climate change can spur both 
temporary and permanent migration as people are no longer able to subsist and thrive in 
their traditional home. 
 These factors not only cause migration, they in turn can be affected by migration.  
As migrants enter an area, tensions can arise between the migrants and the original 
residents.  This tension could lead to conflict between the two groups, which in turn 
could lead to people migrating away from the area.  Similarly, migrants using 
unsustainable agricultural methods could cause permanent environmental damage to an 
area, leading to a shift in the weather patterns of the area, which could then force 
migration away from the region.  Because of the interplay between causes of migration 
and the movement of people, it is imperative to understand the relationships between the 
two in order to accurately model migration. 
 Over the years, there have been multiple theories of how best to represent the 
interplay between the economy and migration.  The first theory is the neoclassical macro 
theory in which laborers will move to the areas where there is better employment and pay 
(Lewis, 1954) (Ranis & Fei, 1961) (Todaro, 1969).  This theory represents the general 
laborer’s decision to migrate as a choice to move to the country which has the highest 
wages, which are interpreted to be the countries with the largest demand for laborers.  
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This theory assumes that there is an equilibrium point at which migration will cease when 
wages become equivalent in all nations. 
 The neoclassical micro theory builds upon the macro theory.  Some authors have 
argued that rather than basing migration off of the gross wage rate in a country, the 
decision to migrate is an individual choice based upon the expected wage after factoring 
in costs of relocating to another area (Sjaastad, 1962) (Todaro, 1980).  This theory 
explains why migration occurs into countries and regions where the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) is lower than the originating region. 
 In contrast to the neoclassical micro theory where the individual is the decision 
maker on whether or not to migrate, the “new economics of migration” theory argues that 
the decision to migrate is made by the family, and not an individual (Massey, Arango, 
Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, & Taylor, 1993).  This theory states that families choose to 
have members of the family migrate in order to diversify the income to the family.  This 
acts as a form of insurance against failures in the local economy and job market, as the 
household is receiving income from differing locations and occupations.  
 Push and Pull Factors. 
 In addition to the economic models of migration mentioned previously, a popular 
theory put forth by Lee (Lee, 1966) depicts migration as a result between various push 
and pull factors.  Push factors occur in the current location of the potential migrant and 
encourage them to leave the area.  Examples of push factors are unemployment, social 
exclusion, crime, violence, and housing conditions.  Pull factors are traits of the receiving 
region that induce people to relocate to that area.  Pull factors include family and friends 
in the area, labor demand, safety, public services, and cost of living.  Additionally, this 
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theory recognizes that besides these push and pull factors, a person must overcome 
certain obstacles in order to physically move from one location to another.  These costs 
could be the distance between the two locations, the cost of moving household goods, or 
immigration laws.  In connection with these obstacles are personal traits that are specific 
to individuals and may cause them to migrate despite the irrationality of the decision 
based solely upon the push and pull factors. 
 Push factors are the attributes of a region that encourage people to leave (Lee, 
1966, p. 50).  Conversely, pull factors are those which draw migrants and refugees to a 
particular region or country.  Main push and pull factors are unemployment rate, 
availability of educational opportunities, crime, violent conflict, family connections, and 
social and political exclusion.  Understanding how each of these factors affects a person’s 
decision to relocate themselves to another country is pivotal in determining future 
instability caused by migration. 
 Determining the effects of these factors is difficult due to the interrelationships 
between them.  For example, a socially excluded group, that is, one which is 
disadvantaged by the local government (or believes itself disadvantaged), may turn to 
crime or violence in order to right its wrongs.  This increase in criminal activity may 
persuade some business owners to relocate their businesses in order to prevent property 
damage and loss, as well as discourage new businesses from starting.  The natural 
consequence of this is that unemployment increases, which in turn could lead to further 
social exclusion.  Criminal activity, particularly violent crimes and armed conflict, 
creates refugees as civilians flee the hostile environment in which they reside.  The 
refugees can then cause stress and tension in the areas they flee to, as they create a shift 
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in the population balance and seek employment.  This stress and tension can then cause 
feelings of social exclusion in the refugees’ destination region.   Due to the 
interdependencies of these factors, determining the specific cause of the resulting 
migration is a complex process. 
 A methodology developed by Jay Forrester known as system dynamics is quite 
useful in examining complex, interconnected problems.  This thesis illustrates how a 
system dynamics model may be built and used to provide an estimate of net migration in 
a given region.  A discussion of system dynamics and its uses is included in the next 
section. 
System Dynamics 
 System dynamics (SD) was first introduced by Jay Forrester in his 1961 text 
Industrial Dynamics.  Forrester defines a system as “a grouping of parts that operate 
together for a common purpose,” (1968, p. 1.1) and dynamic as time-varying behavior 
(Forrester, Industrial Dynamics, 1961, p. 13).  System dynamics, then, is the study of 
how a group of inter-related objects interact and vary over time.  According to the System 
Dynamics Society, SD is “a methodology for studying and managing complex feedback 
systems.” (System Dynamics Home Page, 2009)  SD, initially introduced by Forrester as 
industrial dynamics, was originally applied to industrial processes to provide 
management with a tool to discern the interactions between time delays, amplification, 
and the structure of system components.  Forrester then expanded on his work in Urban 
Dynamics (1969), the modeling of urban environments, and World Dynamics (1971), the 
application of the approach to global changes.   He showed that system dynamics, as it 
had come to be called, could be useful in modeling complex behaviors in fields other than 
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industrial processes.  Since then, system dynamics has become widely used to study the 
dynamic interactions of complex systems.  For example, Richardson, et al, used SD in 
their study of decision making and policy dynamics (1994), SD was central to Andrew 
Ford’s work on environmental models (Ford, 2009), and Bhatt, et al, used a SD model to 
represent predicted maintenance of software systems (Bhatt, Shroff, & Misra, 2004). 
 The US Department of Defense has also used SD to model some of the complex 
problems it deals with.  Grynkewich and Reifel (2006) used a system dynamics approach 
to model the funding of a terrorist organization.  With their model they were able to show 
the interactions between group funding, group activity, and popular support.  In addition, 
Pierson, et al, (Pierson, Barge, & Crane) was able to use a system dynamics model to 
represent the Army’s method for performing counter-insurgency operations.  In 2003 
Ellis (Ellis, 2003) created a model framework using SD which represented the 
instabilities created in a region by the presence of criminal organizations.  Crane (Crane, 
2009) used a SD model to depict the different factors and interactions in gauging nation 
stability in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  In their effort to analyze post-conflict 
reconstruction in foreign countries, Richardson, et al, used SD to model the complexities 
involved in rebuilding a society after a conflict. (Richardson, Deckro, & Wiley, 2004) 
 The System Dynamics Society refers to system dynamics as a methodology.  
They define the steps of this methodology as: 
1)  identify a problem,   
2) develop a dynamic hypothesis explaining the cause of the problem,   
3) build a computer simulation model of the system at the root of the problem,   
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4) test the model to be certain that it reproduces the behavior seen in the real 
world,   
5) devise and test in the model alternative policies that alleviate the problem, and   
6) implement this solution.   
While this process is typical of a modeling approach, the uniqueness of the SD method 
lies in the dynamic hypothesis created in the second step.  This dynamic hypothesis 
consists of depicting the interactions between parts of the system as differential 
equations, which are estimates of the “flow” in the system.  These equations allow for the 
system to be modeled as a continuous-time system, and allow the system to feedback 
upon itself while measuring the current positions of objects to control the system 
behavior.  Properly applying this methodology often leads to each step being executed 
multiple times as hypotheses and models are formulated, tested, verified, and validated. 
 A SD model is a representation of the feedback loops in a system.  A feedback 
loop is a system characteristic in which future states are derived from current states.  
Unlike a discrete event model, a SD model is assumed to change continuously over time 
rather than at discrete events.  The nature of the feedback, whether positive or negative, 
will determine how the system reacts to a change in the system.  Negative feedback loops 
will create an equilibrium-seeking behavior in the model, whereas a positive feedback 
loop will cause the system to grow continually (Forrester, 1971, p. 19).  The continual 
growth generated by positive feedback loops is often undesirable, as it leads to unstable 
systems and models.  Negative feedback loops are the key to the implementation of SD.  
They provide balance to the system by controlling the change in model objects, which 
produces reasonable, realistic outcomes in the system. 
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 To represent these feedback loops, SD uses stocks (or levels), rates, variables, and 
arcs.  A stock is a quantity of an object that will change over time, and is generally 
modeled as the stock name surrounded by a box.  Rates are objects that control the 
change in a stock, and are also referred to as inflows and outflows, depending on how 
they change the stock.  Rates are typically depicted as a double-lined arrow with an 
hourglass symbol.  They may be constant or they may be a function of the levels and 
variables in the model.  A variable is a system parameter that affects, and is affected by, 
the system, but does not have rates continually changing its value.  A variable is 
represented simply by the variable name.  Arcs are used in SD modeling to signify 
relationships between objects in a model.  Arrows are used to represent arcs and connect 
an object to its dependent object.  Figure 1 contains a simple SD model depicting these 
attributes of a SD system. 
 A simple example of this control is the birth and death rates of a population (see 
Figure 1).  Increasing a population size will increase the birth rate of the population; an 
increased birth rate will lead to a further increase in the population.  This example of a 
positive feedback loop would produce an exploding population size without any 
constraints.  However, the negative feedback loop caused by the death rate tempers this 
process.  As seen in Figure 1, the death rate of a population is dependent upon the 
population size, as well as the size of the supportable population.  When a population 
increases past the capacity of its environment to sustain it, the death rate will increase due 
to competition for resources.  Eventually, the death rate will become greater than the birth 
rate, which will lead to a decrease in the population.  As the population is reduced below 
the environment’s capacity, competition for resources will be reduced, the death rate will 
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decrease, and the population will again increase once the birth rate is greater than the 
death rate.  This cycle will repeat itself, potentially creating an oscillation of the 
population about the environmental capacity as it approaches a steady state.  The 
balancing influences of birth and death rates and their feedback loops allow a population 
to sustain itself.  If they are out of balance, then the population could grow or shrink to 
unsupportable levels.  Accurate representation of these feedback loops is a key 
component of successful SD modeling. 
Figure 1: System dynamics model of population 
 
 Since SD deals with studying feedback systems, it is useful when working with a 
system that derives, or predicts, its future state from its current or past states.  In addition, 
as the name implies, system dynamics works well for systems that change over time.  
Thus, an assembly process with a fixed speed and process would be better represented 
using another method, such as a discrete event simulation.  Modeling areas that SD has 
been effective in representing are biological and environmental systems, supply-chain 
management, social sciences, dynamic decision making, and military force management. 
(System Dynamics Home Page, 2009) 
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 As with all modeling approaches, the question of how to verify and validate the 
constructed model is a recurring problem.  Verification is defined as “the process of 
determining that a model or simulation implementation accurately represents the 
developer’s conceptual description and specifications” (Verification - DoD Dictionary of 
Military Terms, 2010).  It requires the model builder to ensure that the outputs are 
reasonable given the inputs into the system.  Conceptually, this step is equivalent to 
checking your math, or debugging your program.  Once the designer is satisfied the 
model operates as designed, the next step is to validate the model. 
  As defined by the DoD, validation is “the process of determining the degree to 
which a model or simulation is an accurate representation of the real world from the 
perspective of the intended uses of the model or simulation” (Validation - DoD 
Dictionary of Military Terms, 2010).  In other words, validation is making sure that the 
model performs the function for which it was originally designed, or, put another way, a 
valid model is one that “is good enough for its purpose” (Coyle & Exelby, 2000, p. 28).  
In building a valid SD model, the developer should be concerned with the users’ purpose 
of the model and strive to accomplish it.  The purpose of modeling a system is to gain 
insight into it.  If the model builder does not know what insight the user hopes to gain 
from the model, the model is useless to the user and it will not be used. 
 In their paper “Tests For Building Confidence In System Dynamics Models”, 
Forrester and Senge (Forrester & Senge, 1980) laid out several tests that are useful in 
establishing the validity of SD models.  The tests proposed by Forrester and Senge are 
largely subjective in nature, and fall within three main areas: structural tests, behavioral 
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tests, and relationship tests.  Shreckengost (DYNAMIC SIMULATION MODELS: How 
Valid are They?) examined these tests and gave further clarification on each. 
 Structural Tests. 
 Ensuring the validity of the model structure is necessary, since the model 
performance is based upon its structure.  Each component of the model should be 
representative of an aspect of the real world system.  There are several tests that help 
ensure this: 
1) Model Parameter Tests – Parameter values should be consistent and 
reasonable with the data available (Shreckengost, p. 2).  The parameters of the 
equations used in the model should be examined by the subject matter experts 
(SMEs) and users to ensure that they are consistent with data and user inputs 
available. 
2) Boundary Adequacy Test – Ensure the boundaries built into the model are 
the same as the boundaries of the system to be examined (Shreckengost, p. 3).  
The model boundaries are the limits placed upon the design of the model.  For 
example, a model designed and built to model the population of Los Angeles 
would fail the Boundary Adequacy test if it was being used to model the 
population of the United States. 
3) Extreme Conditions Test – Testing the extreme conditions can reveal 
logical errors in the model design (Shreckengost, p. 3).  This test will show model 
performance over the range of input values. 
 Behavioral Tests. 
 Behavioral tests examine the behavior of the model to make sure the model 
behaves, or produces the output, in a similar manner as the real system. 
4) Behavior Replication Test – The behavior of the model should parallel the 
behavior of the actual system being studied (Shreckengost, p. 4).  Levels and rates 
in the model should be parallel to those of the real system, i.e., if an action causes 
the real system rate to increase, the same action should not cause the model rate to 
decrease.  Does the model look like the real system? 
5) Anomalous Behavior Test – “When model behavior does not replicate the 
behavior of the real system, model structure, parameter values, boundaries, or 
similar factors are suspect.  Something may have been omitted, improperly 
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specified, or assigned incorrect values” (Shreckengost, p. 5).  If an anomaly 
occurs in the model, when fed with historical data, there is reason to suspect that 
the model contains an error, which would need to be addressed. 
6) Behavior Sensitivity Test – The model should exhibit sensitivity to 
changes consistent with that of the real system (Shreckengost, p. 6).  This means 
that reactions in model should be of the same magnitude and direction as the real 
system.  This would require real world data to compare against, and thus may not 
be feasible to test future changes, if similar ones have not been performed in the 
past. 
7) Behavior Prediction Test – Model reacts to changes in the same manner as 
existing systems reacted to the same changes. (Shreckengost, p. 6) 
 Relationship Tests. 
 Relationship tests are used to assess the applicability of the model to other 
systems.  While these tests do not necessarily help validate the model for its particular 
purpose, if passed, they can increase the usefulness of the model to the user. 
8) Family Member Test – The model will gain extra usefulness if it can be 
applied to a family of systems (Shreckengost, pp. 6-7).  An example of a possible 
family model would be one that was built to model the flow of refugees in 
Rwanda, but could also be applied to refugee situations in other parts of Africa. 
9) Behavioral Boundary Test – Ensure the model boundaries are adequate to 
deal with any excursion that will be explored (Shreckengost, p. 7).  This involves, 
again, knowing the purposes of the model users.  Knowing what they are 
interested in, and the insight they would like to gain from the model will allow the 
model builder to the model boundaries are sufficient to the task.  Passing this test 
allows the model to not only be used to model the current system, but also 
deviations from the current system that the user might be interested in exploring. 
 Conducting these tests on the model will give insight into its usefulness.  They 
will also help refine the model, and eliminate errors and discrepancies that have occurred.  
While these tests should be performed by the author of the model, they should also be 
performed by the user and SMEs to ensure that all requirements are met, as well as to 
secure user trust in the model. 
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  The previously mentioned tests form the core of SD model validation in practice.  
Many SD practitioners have upheld these tests, with a few additional tests proposed (see 
Coyle & Exelby (2000, pp. 32-36) for a detailed examination of papers dealing with SD 
validation).  One such test is the Turing Test as proposed by Barlas (Barlas, 1996).  This 
involves having a person familiar with the real system examine outputs from the real 
system and the model.  Passing the Turing Test occurs when the examiner is unable to 
tell which outputs came from which source. 
 Another method to test and improve the validity of complex models was proposed 
by John H. Miller (Miller J. H., 1998).  In his paper he discusses the use of Active Non-
linear Tests (ANTs) to test the model structure for weaknesses.  He proposes the use of a 
non-linear algorithm to stress the model by seeking to maximize the difference between 
the expected result of the original SD model and results obtained by reasonable 
perturbations of the model (Miller J. H., 1998, p. 820).  The results of this test can then be 
used to make adjustments to the model to eliminate unreasonable fluctuations that were 
discovered. 
 In the ideal case, all of the tests would be performed and passed; in practice, 
however, it may not always be possible to perform all of these tests, or perform all of 
them on all parts of the system, due to resource constraints and deadlines.  Verifying and 
validating sections of the model may be necessary if there is insufficient data to support 
the validation of the overarching model.  The inclusion of specific tests in the validation 
process depends largely upon what data is available and what is known about the system.  
For example, if the internal workings of a system are unknown, then tests that study the 
internal behavior of a system will be irrelevant and tests examining the end result will 
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have to be relied upon.  Conversely, if the details of the system are available, then tests 
should be used which confirm all points of the model behave in the same manner as the 
real system.  Communication with the user is key is developing a valid model, since in 
the end, if the user does not believe that it is valid and doesn’t trust it, then it isn’t a valid 
model and will not be used. 
 In order to fully validate an SD model, several statistical methods should be used.  
Real world data will need to be fitted to dynamic, differentiable equations so the 
performance of the model with real data can be observed.  Several tests have been 
developed to judge the fit of data, including the Chi-Square test, Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
(KS) test, and the Anderson-Darling (AD) test.  While the KS and AD tests are 
considered more powerful tests, users may be more familiar with the Chi-Square test 
(Miller J. O., 2010), thus the “best” test may be the one in which the user has the most 
confidence.  If there is a small data sample size, then the AD or KS tests are the  more 
powerful tests, as they are accurate with small samples, unlike the Chi-Square test.
 Aside from testing the model with real world data, tests should be performed 
using differing input values.  A design of experiments (DOE) approach is useful in 
determining which factors, and at which levels, should be included in the model tests.  
When the tests have been performed, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) should be 
performed to determine which factors, of all the ones being tested, are causing the 
variations in the model results.  The ANOVA performs an F-Test on the results to 
determine if the factors used have significant impacts on the result.  The ANOVA can 
also provide insight into higher order interactions between factors, which knowledge can 
be used for further refinement of the model. 
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 Ideally, the model presented in this study would be verified and validated with all 
of the aforementioned tests.  However, due to data limitations and resource constraints, 
verification and validation is performed using the nine subjective tests summarized by 
Shreckengost.  To determine interactions between factors, a regression was performed on 
the data and an ANOVA was used to verify the factors had a significant impact on the 
result.  The results of this regression is presented in Chapter IV. 
The Democratic Republic of Congo 
 To understand the unique and difficult challenges that the DRC faces as a nation, 
it is important to have a knowledge of the history of the country, as well as the struggles 
the people face in their lives today.  This knowledge will serve as a foundation for 
building a model to represent the net migration in the DRC. 
 The modern history of the DRC begins in 1871 when Henry Morton Stanley 
began the first European exploration of the Congo River basin (Dugard, 2003, p. 119).  
Upon his return to Europe, he entered the employ of the King of Belgium, Leopold II, 
and returned to the Congo to establish a Belgian colony in the region (Heale & Lin, 2010, 
p. 25).  Using his skills in playing one tribe off of another and modern weaponry, Stanley 
was able to open up the Congo for colonization by King Leopold within three years 
(Hochschild, 1999, p. 87). 
 Before sending Stanley to colonize the Congo, Leopold began striving to acquire 
colonies for Belgium.  In 1885 he used his skills in politicking to have the international 
community bestow upon him the private ownership of the Congo region, and it became a 
private colony of the crown known as the Congo Free State.  Ostensibly, Leopold was to 
use his position to assist in the “civilizing” of the Congo natives, though in actuality, the 
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Congo became nothing more than a money making enterprise for the king, at the expense 
of the African natives (Hochschild, 1999, p. 87).  By brutalizing and enslaving the local 
populace, Leopold began the systematic pillaging of the natural resources, particularly 
ivory and rubber, of the Congo Free State.  Despite the attempts of a small number of 
travelers decrying the situation in the Congo, the international furor did not put a stop to 
Leopold’s exploitation until 1908, when the Parliament of Belgium annexed the Congo 
Free State.  By that time, it is estimated that 5 to 12 million Congolese were killed under 
Leopold’s “civilizing” rule (Hochschild, 1999, p. 3) (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2011). 
 Unfortunately, after control of Congo shifted to the Belgian government, daily life 
did not improve significantly.  Body mutilation of the natives was discontinued, but the 
majority of the regional administrators remained the same and the system of forced labor, 
conscription, and beatings continued (Hochschild, 1999, pp. 278-279).  It was common 
practice for a village chief to be paid for mine workers, and the laborers he would send, 
tied together, were those he disliked or who threatened his authority (Hochschild, 1999, 
p. 279).  The tradition of forced labor and exploitation of the native population continued 
until the Belgian Congo gained its independence on June 30, 1960. 
 After gaining independence, the DRC quickly descended into chaos.  Within six 
months of gaining independence, four opposing regimes were established within what 
had once been the Belgian Congo: President Joseph Kasa-Vubu and Colonel Joseph 
Mobutu in western Congo, supported by the US and Western powers; Prime Minister 
Patrice Lumumba in northeastern Congo supported by the Soviet bloc; secessionists in 
southern Kasai Province; and secessionists in Katanga Province led by Moise Tshombe, 
supported by the Belgians (Meredith, 2005, p. 110).  Lumumba was captured and killed 
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in 1961 and the UN ended the revolt in Katanga in 1963.  However, a massive rebellion 
broke out in the former Lumumba stronghold in the northeast in 1964 and the Congolese 
government lost control of nearly half the country (Meredith, 2005, p. 114).  The US and 
Belgium sent forces to the area to protect US and European citizens caught in the conflict 
and to prevent the dissolution of the country.  The rebellion was successfully quelled, but 
political infighting continued until General Mobutu, the Army Chief of Staff, led a 
military coup in 1965 and took control of the government (Meredith, 2005, p. 115). 
 Following his takeover of the government, Mobutu began a systematic effort to 
remove political rivals and crush all rebellions which flared up.  Within five years he had 
gained some level of control over most of the country (Meredith, 2005, p. 294).  Mobutu 
changed the name of the country to Zaire and ruled it for the next 30 years while 
accumulating a personal fortune estimated at $5 billion (Hetzer, 1987).  Mobutu’s rule 
was a model of corruption and control over the political machine.  Political rivals were 
publicly executed and officials in the government were frequently rotated to prevent 
subordinates from gaining too much power.  Foreign owned businesses were seized and 
given to close friends and family members (Meredith, 2005, p. 298).  He built lavish 
palaces for himself in his own country, as well as throughout Europe.   
 Throughout his rule, Mobutu was treated as an ally and friend to the United States 
and its presidents.  Zaire was seen as a bulwark to prevent the spread of communism in 
Africa, and received a number of favorable deals from the US to keep Mobutu’s support 
(Meredith, 2005, pp. 294-295).  Along with the political reasons for allying with Mobutu, 
the US and the rest of the world had an interest in the vast natural resources within 
Zaire’s borders.  Aside from the uranium mines that supplied material for nuclear 
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weapons, the Congo also contains vast amounts of gold, diamonds, copper, tin, and 
several rare earth metals that are used in modern electronic devices.  However, despite 
these vast natural resources, the corruption of Mobutu’s regime prevented this wealth 
from reaching the vast majority of the population.  During Mobutu’s rule, average 
income per capita never climbed over $500 (2010 US dollars) per year (The World Bank, 
2011).  The extreme poverty of the people under Mobutu’s rule, coupled with the 
corruption and the oppression of those deemed political dissidents, caused sentiments of 
unrest to grow among the populace. 
 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, maintaining the alliance with Mobutu 
ceased being a necessity and Western powers began pushing Mobutu to make political 
reforms and eliminate corruption (Meredith, 2005, p. 391).  During the last five years of 
his rule, dissident groups began to gain strength, and Mobutu was forced to give 
concessions to opposing groups and allow multi-party elections. In 1994 an estimated one 
million Hutu refugees and perpetrators of the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda entered eastern 
Zaire after fleeing from Rwanda (Meredith, 2005, p. 522).  The Hutu continued launching 
attacks on Tutsi populations in eastern Zaire and Rwanda until 1996, when Rwanda and 
Uganda sent forces into Zaire with the purpose of halting the attacks and ending 
Mobutu’s rule (Meredith, 2005, pp. 531-532).  In an effort to appease the international 
community, the forces were placed under the command of Laurent-Desire Kabila, an 
anti-Mobutu former guerilla operating in eastern Zaire (Meredith, 2005, p. 531).  By the 
end 1996, the invading forces had sufficient strength that the eastern half of Zaire was 
captured by rebel groups (BBC News, 2010).  In 1997 the rebels managed to overthrow 
Mobutu’s government in Kinshasa (BBC News, 2010), install Laurent Kabila as 
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president, and change the name of the country back to the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. 
 The following years saw multiple wars and conflicts being waged as the DRC’s 
neighbors attempted to gain control and influence over the vast natural resources within 
its borders.  In 2006, a new constitution was accepted, bringing hope of greater stability 
in the country.  However, there are still armed militias and insurgent groups, located 
mainly in the eastern provinces of the DRC, which have resisted integration into civilian 
life and continue to execute assaults on the local populations.  Government troops have 
been sent to the area to quell the insurgents, but lack of logistical support to the troops 
has caused them to take what they need/want from the populace they were sent to protect 
(Kelly, 2010).  Currently the United Nations largest mission, MONUSCO, is in eastern 
DRC in an effort to protect civilians and prevent gross human rights violations that have 
been endemic in the region.  Unfortunately, violent assaults and rapes are committed 
almost daily, some only miles from UN garrisons (Kron, 2010). 
 The ineffectiveness of the government of the DRC to control the violence and 
crime committed within its borders and by its own troops strongly indicates that this is a 
country on the brink of failure.  The corruption existent throughout the government and 
its military has created an environment where businesses do not flourish and the populace 
lives in fear and poverty.  The result of this is high unemployment, violent conflict in 
large portions of the country, and a high occurrence of human rights violations.  In short, 
the DRC is an undesirable country of destination for migration or living, in current 
situation.  This thesis examines several courses of action and their effectiveness at 
reducing migration in the DRC, thereby increasing the country’s stability.  The following 
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chapter details the methodology used to construct a system dynamics model of the net 
migration in the DRC, as well as the notional scenarios that were used to measure the 
effectiveness of possible US actions. 
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III.  Methodology 
 
 
 In an effort to gain insight into one aspect of the effectors of instability in a 
nation, this study develops a preliminary system dynamics model to examine the effects 
policy changes have on net migration in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  This 
chapter is organized as follows.  The purpose of the model is stated along with notional 
courses of action which could be simulated with the model.  The data requirements of the 
model are established, and the data sources are listed.  The construction of model using 
the literature and regression analysis is described.  The method for verifying and 
validating the model is defined.  A design of experiments is then created to test the 
effectiveness of notional courses of action.  The concluding section establishes six 
scenarios which model notional policies which could be enacted in the DRC. 
Model Purpose 
 It is widely accepted that state failure is a very complex issue with multiple causes 
and interacting effects.  This study examines one factor of state failure, net migration, to 
determine the effectiveness of US foreign policy actions in ameliorating outward 
migration.  A study of the literature and US policy towards the DRC gave rise to three 
questions this study strives to address.  These questions are: 
1)  United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (MONUSCO) has tasked the US with the project of road 
construction and maintenance (MONUSCO, 2010).  How would jobs created by 
this effort affect net migration? 
2)  According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), sub-Sahara Africa needs 1.6 million more primary 
education teachers to make primary education available to everyone 
(UNESCOPRESS, 2006).  How would an increase in the number of primary and 
secondary teachers affect net migration? 
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3)  The US has accepted the task of increasing community security and 
reintegrating ex-combatants in the DRC (MONUSCO, 2010).  How will reducing 
the size and scope of the conflict in the DRC affect net migration? 
 With the completion of the model definition and purpose, sources were sought to 
provide data to be regressed and analyzed. 
Data Requirements 
 Databases available from the World Bank (WB) provided much of the data 
regarding the demographics, economy, and education in the DRC.  The WB data has 
been vetted by the United Nations (UN) and is a primary source for certain UN reports 
(UNDP, 2010).  Additional demographic data was provided by UN organizations and the 
US Census Bureau (USCB).  Data regarding the intensity of armed conflict in the DRC 
was taken from the Political Instability Task Force (PITF), a Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) funded organization (Center for Global Policy, 2010).  Note that the data provided 
by the PITF is discrete, categorical data.  In an effort to mitigate the inaccuracies 
involved with using discrete values in a continuous model, the data provided by the PITF 
was modeled as factors controlled by the user.  Table 1 lists the input variables needed to 
execute model and the data source used to drive the DOE and scenario test cases.  For 
two of the variables, Labor Force and Population (Percentage, 15+), the age of fifteen 
was chosen as the delimitating value because this is the UN and WB recognized age to 
estimate when a person enters the workforce.  While this age may be inappropriate for a 
specific country (possibly including the DRC) it is an internationally recognized standard.  
Table 2 lists the output variables produced by the model, as well as the source of the data 
used to fit relationships.  These tables are repeated in Appendix A. 
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Table 1: Input Variables and Sources 
Factor Symbol Description Source 
15+ Population PW The percentage of people over the age of 15 in 
the DRC 
WB* 
Life Expectancy LE The life expectancy at birth for the DRC USCB* 
Magnitude Fighting MFi A dummy variable, 0-4, that represents the 
number of combatants or activists 
participating in an uprising 
PITF** 
Magnitude 
Fatalities 
MFa A dummy variable, 0-4, that represents the 
number of deaths caused by a conflict 
PITF** 
Magnitude Area MA A dummy variable, 0-4, that represents the 
land area size where the conflict is occurring 
PITF** 
Jobs Created JC The number of jobs (thousands) created in the 
DRC by US policies 
N/A*** 
Additional Primary 
Teachers 
APT The number of primary teachers (thousands) 
created in the DRC by US policies 
N/A*** 
Additional 
Secondary Teachers 
AST The number of secondary teachers (thousands) 
created in the DRC by US policies 
N/A*** 
*     These variables were used in the model regression and are not altered in the 
scenarios 
**   These variables were used in the model regression and are altered in the scenarios 
*** These variables were not used in the model regression and are altered in the 
scenarios 
 
 Note that the definitions Unemployment, Change in Unemployment, and Labor 
Force are not those used by the WB.  Since the unemployment rate in the DRC was 
unavailable, a proxy measure of unemployment was established by using the WB statistic 
of Employment to Population Ratio (15+, total (%)).  The Labor Force was then 
calculated by multiplying the size of the population 15+ by the employment ratio.  Thus 
Labor Force in the model represents the number of people actually employed in the DRC. 
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Table 2: Model Variables and Data Sources 
Factor Symbol Description Source 
Population (Total) P Millions of people in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
WB 
Net Migration NM The number of people per million per year who enter 
(positive value) and leave (negative value) the DRC 
WB 
Unemployment U The percentage of the population 15+ who are 
unemployed in the DRC 
WB 
Change in 
Unemployment 
CU The change in the unemployment percentage in the 
DRC in a year 
WB 
Labor Force LF The number of people (in thousands), age 15+, who 
are employed in the DRC 
WB 
GNI per Capita GpC The Gross National Income (Purchasing Power Parity, 
or PPP) per capita in the DRC, measured in 2010 US$ 
WB 
Education Index E 0 to 1 value used by the UN to represent educational 
opportunity and expectations in the DRC 
UNDP 
GNI GNI The Gross National Income (PPP) of the DRC 
measured in millions of 2010 US$ 
WB 
Birth Rate BR Number of live births per thousand per year in the 
DRC 
WB 
Death Rate DR Number of deaths per thousand per year in the DRC WB 
Primary Students 
per Teacher 
PSpT The number of primary students per primary teacher 
in the DRC 
WB 
Primary Pupils PP Number of primary students in the DRC measured in 
thousands 
WB 
Primary Teachers PT Number of primary teachers in the DRC measured in 
thousands 
WB 
Change in Primary 
Teachers 
CPT The increase or decrease in the number of primary 
teachers in the DRC, in thousands per year 
WB 
Secondary Students 
per Teacher 
SSpT The number of secondary students per secondary 
teacher in the DRC 
WB 
Secondary Pupils SP Number of secondary students in the DRC measured 
in thousands 
WB 
Secondary Teachers ST Number of secondary teachers in the DRC measured 
in thousands 
WB 
Change in 
Secondary Teachers 
CST The increase or decrease in the number of secondary 
teachers in the DRC, in thousands per year 
WB 
Refugees Out RO The number of people from the DRC, in thousands, 
who are refugees or in refugee-like situations living 
outside the DRC 
UNHCR 
WB: The World Bank ( http://data.worldbank.org/indicator ) 
UNDP: The United Nations Development Program (http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/tables/default.html) 
UNHCR: The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(http://apps.who.int/globalatlas/DataQuery/default.asp) 
PITF: Political Instability Task Force (http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm)  
USCB: United States Census Bureau International Database 
(http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/country.php) 
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Table 3: PITF Data Value Definitions 
Factor 
Value 
Magnitude Fighting 
(Number of rebel 
combatants or 
activists) 
Magnitude Fatalities 
(Annual number of 
fatalities related to 
fighting) 
Magnitude Area (Portion of 
country affected by fighting) 
0 <100 <100 less than one-tenth of the 
country and no significant cities 
are directly or indirectly 
affected 
1 100 to 1000 100 to 1000 one-tenth of the country (one 
province or state) and/or one or 
several provincial cities are 
directly or indirectly affected 
2 1000 to 5000 1000 to 5000 more than one-tenth and up to 
one quarter of the country 
(several provinces or states) 
and/or the capital city are 
directly or indirectly affected 
3 5000 to 15000 5000 to 10000 from one-quarter to one-half the 
country and/or most major 
urban areas are directly or 
indirectly affected 
4 >15000 >10000 more than one-half the country 
is directly or indirectly affected 
 As noted earlier, the data drawn from the PITF used discrete values on a 0-4 scale 
to represent the Magnitude Fighting, the Magnitude Fatalities, and the Magnitude Area.  
Table 3 shows the ranges of each of the variable values.  These scales are discrete and 
non-linear in nature; unfortunately the precise number of combatants and fatalities was 
not given.  Including this type of data in as a regression model introduces inaccuracies, 
since regression assumes the variables are continuous.  Regressing the categorical PITF 
values to represent violence is a deficiency of the model; using continuous data for 
violence variables would yield more accurate results.  In an effort to mitigate the negative 
effects of the categorical data, the PITF data was used as independent variables in the 
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regression analysis.  Should continuous violence data be made available, it should 
considered in the model. 
Model Construction 
 After the data was gathered from the various sources, it was necessary to fit the 
relationships and effects the different variables had on one another in relation to 
modeling migration.  Using the important factors of migration drawn from the literature, 
likely relationships were predicted to represent the expected interactions.  The main 
driving factors considered were violence, the economy, and education.  Each of these 
main factors was modeled by additional factors in an effort to gain further insight into 
significant effectors of net migration. 
 The JMP 9.0 software package was used to perform linear and non-linear 
regressions to determine the significant relationships of the model, and the impact they 
have on net migration.  A stepwise least squares regression was performed on each output 
variable using likely factors as the independent variables.  Factors to remain in the model 
were required to have p-values less than 0.05.  Once significant variables were 
established, a standard least squares regression was performed to verify the variables 
passed a t-test at the 0.05 level.  In addition multi-collinearity between independent 
variables was reviewed.  If an independent variable failed the t-test, or high multi-
collinearity was found, a stepwise regression was performed with the variable removed 
and the process repeated. 
 Of interest was the finding that the number of fatalities and the area of the conflict 
did not have a statistically significant impact on any output variables for the limited data 
set used.  Therefore, these variables were not included in the SD model and were not 
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considered further in the analysis.  Since these variables have been considered significant 
in other studies, the results developed in this study should be considered illustrative.  If 
more data regarding armed conflict in the DRC became available, future research should 
be done to analyze the impact of violence on net migration in the DRC. 
 The regression equations are detailed in Chapter IV.  Using the regression 
equations developed, as well as the knowledge gained from the literature search, the 
Migration Model of the DRC (MMDRC) model was built using the VenSim PLE 
software, a SD model of migration in the DRC.  Figure 2 shows a diagram of the 
MMDRC.  The model diagram is also contained in Appendix B.  
Figure 2: Diagram of MMDRC 
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Model Initialization 
 Using the literature search and the relations developed with the regression models 
provides the relations for the SD model.  Figure 2 gives a visual representation of how 
the variables relate and interact with each other.  By visual inspection of Figure 2, it can 
be seen which variables are user input driven, require an initial value, or are pure output 
variables.  In the MMDRC all variables with no incoming relationship arcs require the 
user to provide input for each year of the simulation, all stock variables in the model 
require an initial value, and variables with incoming relationship arcs are pure output 
variables.  Variables which require yearly user input are Life Expectancy, 15+ 
Population, Magnitude Fighting, Jobs Created, Additional Primary Teachers, and 
Additional Secondary Teachers; stock variables are Population, Unemployment, Primary 
Teachers, and Secondary Teachers; all others are pure output variables.  It is assumed that 
various courses of actions can be taken to affect the variables which require yearly user 
input.  For example, it follows from the literature and the regression analysis that GNI is 
affected by 15+ Population and Unemployment, and it affects Primary Pupils, GNI per 
Capita, and Net Migration Rate. 
 As MMDRC is constructed to analyze the impact of decisions over time, it is 
initialized with estimated 2011 values.  To estimate the 2011 initial stock values and the 
future values for 15+ Population, MatLab v7.11.0 (R2010b) was used to perform a 
simple linear regression using time as the independent variable.  All recorded data from 
1990 to 2010 for each variable from the previously cited sources was used in the 
regression.  The future values for Life Expectancy were taken from projections for the 
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DRC made by the US Census Bureau (US Census Bureau, 2010).  Table 4 contains the 
values used to initialize the stock variables of the MMDRC for 2011, and the future 
values of Life Expectancy and 15+ Population for 2012 – 2016.  The values for 
Population, Unemployment, Primary Teachers, and Secondary Teachers for the years 
2012 and beyond result from interactions in the model. 
Table 4: Projected Values for Model Inputs 
Variable 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Life Expectancy 55 56 56 57 57 57 
15+ Population 53.9 54.2 54.5 54.7 55 55.3 
Population 69.4 -- -- -- -- -- 
Unemployment 33.4 -- -- -- -- -- 
Primary Teachers 298.1 -- -- -- -- -- 
Secondary Teachers 230.3 -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Verification and Validation 
 As the regression models were constructed, F-tests were performed on each 
equation to verify its significance at the 0.05 level.  The null hypothesis for the F-test is 
that a better F-value can be obtained by random chance if the model fits no better than the 
overall response mean.  A test result of less than 0.05 indicates that there is at least one 
significant factor contained in the model.  As an additional step in the verification and 
validation (V&V) process, the subjective tests described by Shreckengost (Shreckengost) 
were performed on the MMDRC to test its functionality.  Additionally, a design of 
experiments (DOE) was created to verify the impacts the user defined input variables had 
on the output variables.  The results of the V&V process are discussed in further detail in 
Chapter IV. 
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Design of Experiments 
 In order to measure the effectiveness of various proposed policies, a design of 
experiments (DOE) was performed to test the input factors at different levels.  Table 5 
shows the factors that were tested, along with the low, middle, and high levels for each.  
For the categorical values of Magnitude Fighting and Magnitude Fatalities, each of the 
values 0 through 4 was included in the design.  The high level for Jobs Created was 
estimated as the number of workers needed to build the proposed Grand Inga Dam in 
northwestern DRC.  The estimated number of workers needed was based upon the 
number of workers who worked on the Three Gorges Dam, constructed in China.  Since 
an estimated 60,000 workers were used to complete the Three Gorges Dam (Hays, 2010), 
and the proposed Grand Inga Dam in the DRC is projected to be an even larger 
undertaking, the number of jobs created in working on the Grand Inga Dam was 
estimated at 70,000.  The high value for Additional Primary and Secondary Teachers was 
estimated using 5% and 3%, respectively, of the number of education majors in the US 
who graduated in the 2007-2008 academic year, which was 103,000 (National Center for 
Education Statistics, 2009).  These are notional values of how many teachers could be 
sent to the DRC.  It is recognized that a major in education is not required to teach 
primary and secondary students in the DRC. 
 Using the values in Table 5, a mixed design combining three 2-level variables 
with five midpoints (the continuous variables), and two 5-level variables (the categorical 
variables) was generated to test the full range of parameter values while preventing the 
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confounding of main effects.  This resolution III design requires 25 runs for the analysis 
and is shown in Appendix C.  The results of the DOE are examined in Chapter V. 
Table 5: Input Varible Levels for DOE 
Variable Low 
Value 
Mid 
Value 
High 
Value 
Magnitude Fighting 0 - 4 
Magnitude Fatalities 0 - 4 
Jobs Created per Year (Thousands) 0 35 70 
Additional Primary Teachers per 
Year (Thousands) 
0 2.575 5.15 
Additional Secondary Teachers per 
Year (Thousands) 
0 1.545 3.09 
 
Test Creation 
 Following the construction of the functional model, test cases were defined to test 
the impact of US policies on net migration in the DRC.  The purpose of these scenarios is 
to analyze the effects policies have if they are executed in multiple years, as well as to 
determine if notional US policies could affect significant changes in the migration rate in 
the DRC.  These test scenarios were derived from current US and UN projects and 
objectives in the DRC and the author’s estimations of how these projects will proceed in 
the future.  Results from each scenario are simulated for five years following 
initialization and are analyzed in Chapter V. 
 Scenario1 
 Scenario 1 was established by initializing all input values at their projected 2011 
levels. The input values are held constant, allowing natural growth for the next five years.  
The input driven variables, Life Expectancy and 15+ Population, continue to change 
according to the estimates obtained from MatLab, as previously mentioned.  All other 
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inputs are held constant.  As indicated by a Magnitude Fighting value of 3, there are an 
estimated 5,000 to 15,000 rebel combatants involved in the conflict each year.  The 
Magnitude Fatalities value of 2 indicates there were between 1,000 and 5,000 combat 
related deaths.  Table 6 shows the settings used for the baseline scenario. 
Table 6: Scenario 1 Inputs – Inputs Constant 
Year of 
Simulation 
Input Variable 
Magnitude 
Fighting 
Magnitude 
Fatalities 
Additional 
Primary 
Teachers (K) 
Additional 
Secondary 
Teachers (K) 
Jobs 
Created 
(K) 
0 3 2 0 0 0 
1 3 2 0 0 0 
2 3 2 0 0 0 
3 3 2 0 0 0 
4 3 2 0 0 0 
5 3 2 0 0 0 
 
 Scenario 2 
 The second scenario tests a situation in which security forces are able to 
successfully quell the insurgent activity.  A steady decrease in the Magnitude Fighting 
and the Magnitude Fatalities is projected while Additional Primary Teachers, Additional 
Secondary Teachers, and additional Jobs Created remain constant at 0, meaning these 
teachers and jobs in the DRC are not considered to be directly affected by this policy.  
Whatever changes occur in the other variables are endogenous to the model.  In year 1, 
the number of insurgents drops below 5,000, but remain above 1,000.  The fatalities 
occurring also decreased to the 100 - 1,000 range of deaths.  In year 2, the insurgents 
continue to lose forces and their numbers fall below 1,000 combatants.  In year 3 the 
fighting is further quelled as the number of fatalities falls below 100.  In year 4 the 
number of insurgents falls below 100 and are held below 100 in year 5 as well.  It should 
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be noted, however, that no specific actions are detailed to execute these reductions.  The 
estimates are merely provided to test the model and judge the potential effect of a 
reduction in violence, given appropriate actions have been designed.  Table 7 shows the 
settings used for Scenario 2. 
Table 7: Scenario 2 Inputs – Only Intensity of Hostilities Reduced 
Year of 
Simulation 
Input Variable 
Magnitude 
Fighting 
Magnitude 
Fatalities 
Additional 
Primary 
Teachers (K) 
Additional 
Secondary 
Teachers (K) 
Jobs 
Created 
(K) 
0 3 2 0 0 0 
1 2 1 0 0 0 
2 1 1 0 0 0 
3 1 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Scenario 3 
 Scenario 3 tests the situation in which the US sends primary and secondary 
teachers to educate citizens of the DRC and train replacements.  Following an initial 
surge in educators, these teachers will slowly leave until they all have returned to the US.  
They will, however, train locals to become teachers.  In the initial year, 2,450 primary 
teachers are sent to the DRC.  By year 1, 2,450 primary teachers and 240 secondary 
teachers have arrived in the DRC.  By year 2, an additional 1,470 secondary teachers and 
4,000 primary teachers arrive.  Additionally, local teachers begin to replace the external 
teachers, which creates 3,000 jobs in the DRC.  In year 3, an additional 1,770 secondary 
teachers arrive and 2,060 primary teachers arrive.  An additional 3,000 teaching jobs are 
also created.  The final 520 secondary teachers arrive in year 4, bringing the total 
teaching positions created by foreign aid to 8,510 primary teachers and 4000 secondary 
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teachers.  Subsequently, in years 4 and 5, 1,000 teaching jobs are created each year, 
bringing the total jobs created to 8,000.  This scenario assumes that while some teachers 
may begin to leave after a few years, their numbers will be replenished by new teachers 
arriving or by replacements being trained in-country.  Table 8 shows the settings used for 
Scenario 3. 
Table 8: Scenario 3 Inputs – Hostilities Constant, Increased Education Capability Policy 
Year of 
Simulation 
Input Variable 
Magnitude 
Fighting 
Magnitude 
Fatalities 
Additional 
Primary 
Teachers (K) 
Additional 
Secondary 
Teachers (K) 
Jobs 
Created 
(K) 
0 3 2 1 0 0 
1 3 2 4 .5 0 
2 3 2 4 2.5 3 
3 3 2 0 2 3 
4 3 2 0 0 1 
5 3 2 0 0 1 
 
 Scenario 4 
Table 9: Scenario 4 Inputs – Hostility Constant, Increased Non-Educational Jobs Policy 
Year of 
Simulation 
Input Variable 
Magnitude 
Fighting 
Magnitude 
Fatalities 
Additional 
Primary 
Teachers (K) 
Additional 
Secondary 
Teachers (K) 
Jobs 
Created 
(K) 
0 3 2 0 0 20 
1 3 2 0 0 35 
2 3 2 0 0 0 
3 3 2 0 0 0 
4 3 2 0 0 -5 
5 3 2 0 0 -5 
 
 Scenario 4 looks at the situation where there is an increase in employment 
opportunities in the DRC beyond the educational arena.  This scenario initially creates a 
large number of jobs opportunities, but after a three year period some of these jobs are no 
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longer available as projects are completed.  In year 0, 20,000 jobs are added to the DRC 
by foreign aid actions.  In year 1, an additional 35,000 jobs are added to the economy.  In 
years 2 and 3, these 55,000 jobs continue with no net increases or decreases.  However, in 
year 4, 5,000 jobs are no longer needed and are removed from the country.  In year 5, an 
additional 5,000 jobs are removed, leaving a total of 45,000 induced jobs remaining in 
the country.  Table 9 shows the settings used for Scenario 4. 
 Scenario 5 
 Scenario 5 combines aspects of Scenarios 3 and 4.  Despite ongoing insurgent 
activity, primary and secondary teachers are sent from the US, as well as job 
opportunities being created.    The input values for Jobs Created are the same as in 
Scenario 4.  Additional primary and secondary teachers have the same inputs as scenario 
3.  Table 10 shows the settings used for Scenario 5. 
Table 10: Scenario 5 Inputs – Hostilities Constant, Increased Education and Non-
Education Jobs Policy 
Year of 
Simulation 
Input Variable 
Magnitude 
Fighting 
Magnitude 
Fatalities 
Additional 
Primary 
Teachers (K) 
Additional 
Secondary 
Teachers (K) 
Jobs 
Created 
(K) 
0 3 2 1 0 20 
1 3 2 4 .5 35 
2 3 2 4 2.5 3 
3 3 2 0 2 3 
4 3 2 0 0 -4 
5 3 2 0 0 -4 
 
 Scenario 6 
 Scenario 6 combines scenarios 2 and 3.  Violence is reduced and primary and 
secondary teachers are sent into the DRC.  The number of primary and secondary 
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teachers sent into the country and the effect they have on jobs is the same as in scenario 
3.  The decline in Magnitude Fatalities and Magnitude Fighting is the same as in scenario 
2.  Table 11 lists the inputs used for scenario 6. 
Table 11: Scenario 6 Inputs – Hostilities Reduced, Increased Education Policy 
Year of 
Simulation 
Input Variable 
Magnitude 
Fighting 
Magnitude 
Fatalities 
Additional 
Primary 
Teachers (K) 
Additional 
Secondary 
Teachers (K) 
Jobs 
Created 
(K) 
0 3 2 1 0 0 
1 2 1 4 .5 0 
2 1 1 4 2.5 3 
3 1 0 0 2 3 
4 0 0 0 0 1 
5 0 0 0 0 1 
 
 Scenario 7 
 Scenario 7 combines elements of scenario 2 and scenario 4.  The fighting and 
deaths are reduced over time, and additional jobs are created in the DRC.  The decline in 
Magnitude Fatalities and Magnitude Fighting is the same as in scenario 2, and jobs are 
created according to the description of scenario 4.  Table 12 lists the inputs used for 
scenario 7. 
Table 12: Scenario 7 Inputs – Hostilities Reduced, Increased Non-Education Jobs Policy 
Year of 
Simulation 
Input Variable 
Magnitude 
Fighting 
Magnitude 
Fatalities 
Additional 
Primary 
Teachers (K) 
Additional 
Secondary 
Teachers (K) 
Jobs 
Created 
(K) 
0 3 2 0 0 20 
1 2 1 0 0 35 
2 1 1 0 0 0 
3 1 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 -5 
5 0 0 0 0 -5 
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 Scenario 8 
 Scenario 8 combines the first three scenarios.  Combatant forces are reduced in 
number and effectiveness, which creates a more hospitable environment for international 
organizations and foreign enterprises to send educators and invest in the DRC economy, 
resulting in increases in job creation and teachers.  The teachers and jobs are inserted and 
removed in the same time and quantities as Scenario 5.  In addition, the number of 
insurgents and fatalities respond in the same manner as Scenario 2.  Table 13 shows the 
settings used for Scenario 8. 
Table 13: Scenario 8 Inputs – Hostilities Reduced, Increased Education and Non-Education 
Jobs Policy 
Year of 
Simulation 
Input Variable 
Magnitude 
Fighting 
Magnitude 
Fatalities 
Additional 
Primary 
Teachers (K) 
Additional 
Secondary 
Teachers (K) 
Jobs 
Created 
(K) 
0 3 2 1 0 20 
1 2 1 4 .5 35 
2 1 1 4 2.5 3 
3 1 0 0 2 3 
4 0 0 0 0 -4 
5 0 0 0 0 -4 
 
 The methodology described in this chapter has detailed how operations research 
principles were used to construct the MMDRC.  In an effort to ensure that the model 
performs as expected and is a useful representation of the real world, the verification and 
validation techniques described in Chapter II were performed on the MMDRC.  Chapter 
IV contains the results of the V&V process and some of the implications those results 
have on the model. 
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IV.  Establishing the Underlying Relations and Vetting 
 
 
 The methodology described in the previous chapter described how the system 
dynamics model representing migration was developed.  Chapter III outlined how 
portions of the model were partially verified and validated.  The regression analysis and 
statistical tests performed on the data to establish these relations is discussed in this 
chapter.  The resulting equations and their relationship to the real world is also discussed.  
Following the discussion of the regression analysis, the subjective tests suggested by 
Shreckengost (Shreckengost) are then reviewed in relation to the model results. 
Regressing the Data 
 The JMP 9.0 software package was used to perform linear and non-linear 
regression on the data to determine the relationships used in the model, and the impact 
they have on migration.  A stepwise least squares regression was performed on each 
model output variable, using an F-test to enter and leave, with likely factors selected from 
the input and remaining model output variables as the independent variables.  Variables 
to enter and remain in the model were required to pass the F-test at the α = 0.05 level.  
The hypotheses for the F-test are: 
 
 
 For theses hypotheses, the number of observations is greater than k.  Being unable 
to accept the null hypothesis indicates that at least one of the regressors has a non-zero 
beta coefficient.  Once a statistically significant model was identified, it remained to 
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verify that the variables passed a t-test at the α = 0.05 level.  The hypotheses for the t-test 
are: 
 
 
 
 For theses hypotheses, the number of observations is greater than k, and K is the # 
of independent variables in the equation.  The t-test null hypothesis is that the variable 
coefficient equals 0.  Failing to accept the null hypothesis of the t-test implies that one is 
unable to accept the coefficient is zero; that is, it is assumed to have a non-zero value.  
Additionally, the correlation matrix was examined to determine if high multi-collinearity 
existed between variables.  If factors failed the t-test, or high multi-collinearity was 
found, a stepwise regression was performed with the variable removed and the process 
repeated.  After significance of the individual variables was determined, an F-test was 
performed on each regression equation to ensure that the equation as a whole was 
significant at the 0.05 level.  A table showing the variables, their abbreviations, and 
definitions can be found in Appendix A.   
Regression Equations  
 This section contains the individual regression equations for variables listed in 
Table 2 and Appendix A, the standard deviation (std) of each independent variable’s 
coefficient, and the results of the t-test for each independent variable and constant term.  
Additionally, the number of recorded data points, n, used for the regression is listed.  
Note that the number of data points available is small. This can make the values obtained 
from the regression inaccurate and unsuitable for real world use.  However, for this 
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demonstration these equations are useful in conveying relationships of the factors, as well 
as the complexity of modeling a single aspect of state failure. 
 Net Migration Rate (migrants per thousand) 
NM = 1012.2 - 30.24*U - 7.187*MFa 
Std (391.1)  (11.98)  (3.21) 
Prob >|t| (0.0206)  (0.0234)  (0.0407) 
 
 This equation shows the relationship between the Net Migration Rate and its 
effectors, Unemployment and Magnitude Fatalities.  For each percent increase in 
Unemployment, the number of people coming into the DRC each year decreases by 30.24 
per thousand.  Additionally, for each categorical increase in Magnitude Fatalities, the 
flow of people into the DRC each year decreases by 7.2 per thousand.  These 
relationships are reasonable.  This equation is valid for Unemployment values of 32.2 ≤ 
U ≤ 33.4 and Magnitude Fatalities values of MFa = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4.  
 Education Index (unitless) 
E = 0.339 - 0.0122*SSpT + 0.000807*PT 
Std (0.0396)  (0.00246)  (0.0000767) 
Prob >|t| (<.0001)  (0.0002)  (<.0001) 
 
 The regression equation for the Education Index suggests that increase in the 
number of primary and secondary teachers in the DRC will improve the education level.  
12,400 additional primary teachers would affect a 0.01 increase in the Education Index, 
and an average of one additional student per teacher would reduce the Education Index 
by 0.0122.  This is reasonable, as a greater number of teachers means greater 
opportunities to be taught and more individual attention for those students who attend.  
n = 18 Adj. R2 = .656 Std dev = 13 Prob>F =   0.0001 
n = 18 Adj. R2 = .891 Std dev = 0.0126 Prob>F =   <.0001 
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This equation is valid for Secondary Students per Teacher values of 13.72 ≤ SSpT ≤ 
20.26, and Primary Teacher values of 114 ≤ PT ≤ 255.6. 
 Change in Unemployment (percentage points per year) 
CU = 0.531 - 1.68*E 
Std (0.195)  (0.698) 
Prob >|t| (0.0159)  (0.0295) 
 This equation shows that for each 0.01 increase in the Education Index of the 
DRC, the unemployment rate decreases by 0.0168% a year.  This is reasonable, as a more 
educated population produces more innovation and entrepreneurialism, which creates 
more jobs.  It is noted that the equation is valid for Education Index values of 0.1977 ≤ E 
≤ 0.3436. 
 Gross National Income (millions of 2010 US dollars) 
GNI = -281638 + 288.5*LF + 5542.6*PW 
Std (31119)  (81.62)  (608.4) 
Prob >|t| (<.0001)  (0.003)  (<.0001) 
 
 The GNI equation suggests that for each percentage increase of the population 
over 15 (the UN designated age to enter the workforce) the GNI increases by 5.54 billion  
2010 US dollars.  This is reasonable since this means there are proportionally more 
people available to work and produce income.  Additionally, it is reasonable for the GNI 
to increase due to a rise in the Labor Force, as these are the people employed in the 
country, and as the number of people working increases, wealth should increase as well.  
The ratio of this increase is a 288.5 dollar increase in the GNI for every additional 
n = 17 Adj. R2 = .23 Std dev = 0.103 Prob>F =   0.0295 
n = 18 Adj. R2 = .902 Std dev = 779.3 Prob>F =   <.0001 
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worker.  This equation is valid for 15+ Population values of 51.88 ≤ PW ≤ 53.33 and 
Labor Force values of 14.05 ≤ LF ≤ 22.72. 
 Birth Rate (births per thousand) 
BR = 62.54 - 0.374*P + 0.409*MFi 
Std (0.902)  (0.018)  (0.113) 
Prob >|t| (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0023) 
 
 This equation suggests that for every million increase in the population, the birth 
rate decreases by 0.374 births per thousand per year.  This is expected of the birth rate, as 
competition for resources and food can limit population growth.  The relationship 
between the number of insurgents fighting and birth rate is counter-intuitive.  It shows 
that for every categorical increase in the number of rebel combatants fighting there is a 
0.409 increase in the number of births per thousand per year.  In the case of the DRC, the 
positive relationship could be due to the large number of rapes committed by armed 
forces in the DRC.  However, it is noted that Magnitude Fighting is a categorical variable 
and may produce inaccurate results when used in a regression model.  Further 
investigation into this relationship is recommended for future analysis.  This equation is 
valid for Population values of 37.94 ≤ P ≤ 64.21, and Magnitude Fighting values of  
MFi = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4. 
 Death Rate (deaths per thousand) 
DR = 46.84 - 0.0524*P - 0.584*LE 
Std (2.089)  (0.014)  (0.048) 
Prob >|t| (<.0001)  (0.0018)  (<.0001) 
 
n = 19 Adj. R2 = .96 Std dev = 0.581 Prob>F =   <.0001 
n = 19 Adj. R2 = .952 Std dev = 0.364 Prob>F =   <.0001 
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 The regression equation for death rate shows that for each million person increase 
in the population, the death rate decreases by 0.052 deaths per thousand per year.  
Additionally, each year of increased life expectancy results in a death rate decreased by 
0.584 deaths per thousand per year.  When people in the DRC live longer, there are less 
people dying, which is the expected result, although it is difficult to determine which 
factor is the cause and which is the effect.  However, as aid policies would focus on 
increasing life expectancy, change in life expectancy will be considered the cause.  This 
equation is valid for Population values of 37.94 ≤ P ≤ 64.21,and Life Expectancy values 
of 44 ≤ LE ≤ 55 
 Primary Pupils (thousands) 
PP = -4511 + 93.63*P + 0.442*GNI 
Std (1237)  (30.1)  (0.0902) 
Prob >|t| (0.0024)  (0.0072)  (0.0002) 
 
 The regression shows that the number of primary pupils is a function of the size 
of the population and the GNI of the DRC.  This equation suggests that for each increase 
of one million in population, there are 93,630 more primary pupils.  Additionally, 
education can be costly in the DRC, so it is expected that as the GNI increases, improving 
financial situations would allow for more children to attend school.  The regression 
equation estimates an additional 442 students for each million dollar increase of the GNI.  
This equation is valid for Population values of 37.94 ≤ P ≤ 64.21, and Gross National 
Income values of 10,138 ≤ GNI ≤ 18,096. 
 
n = 18 Adj. R2 = .83 Std dev = 728.9 Prob>F =   <.0001 
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 Change in Primary Teachers (thousands per year) 
CPT = -34.2 + 2.42*LF  
Std (8.84)  (0.5)  
Prob >|t| (0.0015)  (0.0002)  
 
 This equation indicates that there is a linear relationship between the number of 
secondary teachers and the number of people employed in the DRC.  For each million 
increase in the number of employed workers, there is a 2,420 increase in the number of 
primary teachers trained each year.  This is a reasonable relationship as employed people 
could afford to send their children to school, which would create a higher demand for 
teachers.  Additionally, teachers are part of the workforce, so if there are more workers in 
the country, it is reasonable that some of them are teachers.  This equation is valid for 
Labor Force values of 14.05 ≤ LF ≤ 22.72. 
 Secondary Pupils (thousands) 
SP = -4353 + 322.98*LF 
Std (120.5)  (6.1) 
Prob >|t| (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
 
 The number of secondary pupils in the DRC is dependent upon the size of the 
labor force.  As the labor force increases, more people will seek additional education both 
in an attempt to become more employable, but also because families can afford to have a 
child stay in school.  For each million increase in the number of employed workers, there 
is a 323,000 increase in the number of secondary students.  This equation is valid for 
Labor Force values of 14.05 ≤ LF ≤ 22.72. 
 
n = 17 Adj. R2 = .585 Std dev = 4.76 Prob>F =   0.0002 
n = 10 Adj. R2 = .997 Std dev = 35 Prob>F =   <.0001 
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 Change in Secondary Teachers (thousands per year) 
CST = -6.536 + 0.4856*PSpT 
Std (120.5)  (6.1) 
Prob >|t| (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
 
 The equation for the change in secondary teachers shows that as the average 
number of primary students per teacher increases by one, an additional 490 secondary 
teachers will be produced each year.  This appears reasonable in that more students will 
be eligible for secondary education, and thus more teachers will be required and trained.  
Additionally, primary teachers could advance to teach secondary school, in an effort to 
acquire higher pay and prestige.  This would cause a higher primary student to teacher 
ratio and increase the number of secondary teachers.  This equation is valid for Primary 
Students per Teacher values of 25.74 ≤ PSpT ≤ 50.35. 
Combined Functions 
 In addition to the regressed equations mentioned, the model uses combined 
functions of the regressed and input variables to calculate additional output variables and 
regression factors.  These equations are explained in the following section. 
 Population (millions) 
P =   
 Since population is a stock variable, its value is based upon the flow of people 
into and out of the DRC throughout the entire simulation.  The population of the current 
simulation year is calculated by adding the net migration rate to the birth rate and 
subtracting the death rate.  Since this quantity is measured in births per million per year, 
it is multiplied by the current population to calculate millions of births per year.  
n = 9 Adj. R2 = .843 Std dev = 1.51 Prob>F =   <.0001 
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Integrating this quantity over the simulation time yields the change in population from 
the initial value, and adding the initial population value give the value for the next year’s 
population. 
 Unemployment (percentage, 0 – 100) 
U =   
 Unemployment is another stock variable in the model, and as such, the change in 
unemployment from year to year is modeled.  The effect on unemployment by the 
policies of the current simulation year is found by first dividing the jobs created by 
foreign policies by the current population.  This interim result has the same units as 
Change in Unemployment.  This quantity is subtracted from the change in unemployment 
value and integrated over the simulation time to find the net change in unemployment.  
Adding this number to the initial unemployment rate will result in the unemployment rate 
of the next simulation year.  This makes the conservative assumption that job growth is 
only associated with the changes effected by the policy scenario being tested. 
 Labor Force (millions) 
LW = PW /100 * P * (100-U)/100 
 To calculate the labor force, the population is multiplied by the percentage of the 
population age 15+ and the result is multiplied by the employment rate of those 15+.  
Again, 15 is the international age of entering the workforce according to the World Bank 
(The World Bank, 2010). 
 GNI per Capita (2010 US dollars per capita) 
GpC = GNI / P 
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 The GNI per Capita is calculated by dividing the GNI, (Purchasing Power Parity, 
2010 US dollars) by the population. 
 Primary Students per Teacher (unitless) 
PSpT = PP / PT 
 The primary students per teacher ratio is calculated by dividing the number of 
primary students by the number of primary teachers. 
 Primary Teachers (thousands) 
PT =  
 The number of primary teachers is a stock variable in the model and is a function 
of the integral of the change in primary teacher and additional primary teacher rates.  The 
number of primary teachers is calculated by first integrating the sum of the change in 
primary teachers and additional primary teachers over the simulation time.  This result is 
added to the initial number of primary teachers to give the total primary teachers in the 
country. 
 Secondary Students per Teacher (unitless) 
SSpT = SP / ST 
 The secondary students per teacher ratio is calculated by dividing the number of 
secondary students by the number of secondary teachers. 
 Secondary Teachers (thousands) 
ST =  
 The number of secondary teachers is a function of the integral of the change in 
secondary teacher and additional secondary teacher rates.  The number of secondary 
teachers is calculated by first integrating the sum of the change in secondary teachers and 
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additional secondary teachers over the simulation time.  This result is added to the initial 
number of secondary teachers to give the total secondary teachers in the country. 
Subjective Tests of the Model 
 Given the equations driving the model, the model in its entirety was examined for 
robustness.  The subjective tests proposed by Shreckengost and detailed in Chapter II are 
used to validate the model.  
1) Model Parameter Tests – The parameters of the model are all derived from 
real world data and have reasonable results when fitted to actual data. 
2) Boundary Adequacy Test – The model was built to model the net 
migration into the DRC in order to test the specified scenarios.  While certainly 
other factors interact in the complex problem, this is the purpose for which it is 
being used. 
3) Extreme Conditions Test – The extreme values of the input parameters can 
be handled by the model.  However, running the model for decades can result in 
impractical values.  Analysis of some of the regression equations indicate that 
certain extreme values could render implausible results, however, during the 
simulation of the scenarios these extreme values were never approached. 
4) Behavior Replication Test – As shown in the section discussing the 
relations, the model tends to react in the same direction as one would expect in the 
real world.  Several factors, however, do suggest further analysis is warranted as 
more data becomes available. 
5) Anomalous Behavior Test – No unexpected anomalies were observed in 
the model.  However, no anomaly was injected into the analysis to gauge its 
potential effect. 
6) Behavior Sensitivity Test – Due to the nature of the real system, 
sensitivity analysis could not be performed on the real system.  Changes in the 
model appear to behave consistent with predictions of how the real system would 
change.  It should be noted, however, that while significant, some relations’ 
standard deviations were large. 
7) Behavior Prediction Test – As there are no existing systems representing 
migration in the DRC available, this test was unable to be performed. 
8) Family Member Test – The model framework is constructed in such a way 
that it could be applied to other countries.  However, coefficients of the regression 
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equations are likely unique to the DRC.  Country data should be fitted and 
analyzed to determine adjustments to parameter values. 
9) Behavioral Boundary Test – The boundaries of the model are sufficient to 
deal with foreseeable excursions in the DRC.  Expanding the use of the model to a 
region differing from that of the DRC may give inaccurate results due to the 
social, political, and economical differences.  As the test policies are focused on 
the DRC, the DRC was an acceptable boundary. 
 The conclusions of these tests indicate that the results of the model are reasonable 
for the proposed purpose and can be useful in gaining insight into the effects US policies 
have on net migration.  It is noted that results acquired from extended time horizons may 
be inaccurate.  This is due to variability which is not captured in the model, and the 
inaccuracy of regressions as they are extended beyond the set from which they were 
formed.  
 This chapter has suggested that the MMDRC is a reasonable representation of net 
migration in the DRC for examining near future support policies.  Chapter V investigates 
the impacts certain policy actions could have on the net migration situation in the DRC.  
A design of experiments was created and executed using 4 inputs to test the statistical 
significance of policy variations.  Six hypothetical scenarios were then simulated using 
MMDRC and their results are analyzed. 
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V.  Analysis of Demonstration Scenarios 
 
 
 Using the methodology described in Chapter III, a system dynamics model was 
developed to investigate the possibility of evaluating the effects of notional policies on 
net migration in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  Regression analysis was performed 
to fit underlying relationships relating to migration.  In addition, a Design of Experiments 
and test scenarios were described.  Chapter IV reviewed the regression equations and the 
model in general to gain confidence that the output produced by the MMDRC was 
accurate and useful.  This chapter analyzes the results obtained from executing a DOE 
created to test the effects the proposed policies had on net migration. 
Design of Experiments Results 
 The DOE described in Chapter III was implemented to determine the effects of 
policy driven factors.  A mixed level design was used in order to test the full range of 
categorical input values as well as possible values for the continuous variables.  A table 
of the runs executed in the design is contained in Appendix C.  Upon completing the 25 
runs required for the design, the main effects were analyzed to determine their 
significance to net migration in the initial year, 2011, and the subsequent five years of 
simulation time.   
   The Net Migration Rate was the output of interest for this simulation.  The 
values of the Net Migration Rate obtained from the model runs are contained in the 
following tables.  Table 14 shows the level of net migration obtained from the execution 
of the DOE.  Table 15 shows a list of the significant inputs to the migration rate for each 
year studied. 
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Table 14: Results of Net Migration Rate (People per Thousand per Year) for Test Runs 
Run # 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
1 -17.92 -6.6 -1.3 5.05 12.39 20.7 
2 3.64 -6.7 -1.51 4.76 12.07 20.38 
3 -25.11 -5.08 0.13 6.36 13.57 21.74 
4 -10.73 -6.65 -1.41 4.89 12.2 20.49 
5 -3.55 -5.15 -0.01 6.19 13.4 21.59 
6 -3.55 -6.71 -1.53 4.72 12 20.27 
7 -10.73 -5.17 -0.07 6.09 13.24 21.38 
8 -25.11 -6.62 -1.36 4.94 12.24 20.49 
9 3.64 -5.28 -0.3 5.76 12.85 20.95 
10 -3.55 -6.73 -1.59 4.64 11.89 20.14 
11 -17.92 -6.63 -1.36 4.96 12.28 20.56 
12 3.64 -6.78 -1.7 4.47 11.69 19.92 
13 -3.55 -5.18 -0.08 6.08 13.26 21.43 
14 -25.11 -6.52 -1.1 5.34 12.77 21.14 
15 -10.73 -5.06 0.2 6.49 13.79 22.04 
16 -25.11 -4.96 0.41 6.79 14.14 22.43 
17 -10.73 -6.68 -1.48 4.78 12.07 20.33 
18 -17.92 -5.02 0.29 6.62 13.94 22.21 
19 3.64 -5.21 -0.14 6 13.18 21.35 
20 -17.92 -5.13 0.02 6.21 13.4 21.55 
21 3.64 -5.98 -0.9 5.27 12.47 20.68 
22 -3.55 -5.94 -0.79 5.42 12.66 20.88 
23 -10.73 -5.89 -0.68 5.58 12.84 21.08 
24 -17.92 -5.84 -0.57 5.73 13.02 21.28 
25 -25.11 -5.79 -0.46 5.88 13.21 21.48 
 
 A comparison of Table 14 with the inputs of each run shows that the fluctuations 
in the net migration in 2011 are due entirely to the value of Magnitude Fatalities.  This is 
because the 2011 values are calculated at the simulation start time before the flows in the 
system are turned on.  Magnitude Fatalities is the only input that does not go through a 
stock or flow variable before affecting net migration.  2012 is the first simulation year 
when all input factors affect net migration.  It is also important to note that the values for 
net migration all lie within the range of values seen in the historical data, indicating that 
these results are realistic. 
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Table 15: Significance of Input Variables on Net Migration Rate 
Input Variable Prob > F 
in 2011 
Prob > F 
in 2012 
Prob > F 
in 2013 
Prob > F 
in 2014 
Prob > F 
in 2015 
Prob > F 
in 2016 
Magnitude Fighting 1.0 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Magnitude Fatalities <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Jobs Created 1.0 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Additional Primary 
Teachers 
1.0 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Additional Secondary 
Teachers 
1.0 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
 
 The results shown in Table 15 indicate that all five input variables have 
significant effects on the Net Migration Rate in this model at the α = 0.01 level.  
Additionally, a change in an input in the first year of simulation will continue to have a 
significant effect in future simulation years.  Table 15 also shows that Magnitude 
Fatalities is the only input that affects the initial level of Net Migration.  This is due to the 
layout of the model and how the Vensim software calculates initial values.  Increasing 
jobs and/or the number of teachers in the DRC is predicted to have a positive effect on 
the net migrants entering the DRC.  Additionally, the model suggests that reducing the 
number of combatants and fatalities in the DRC will increase the net migration into the 
country.  Creating jobs in the DRC appears to have the greatest effect on migration.  This 
is true for all simulated years, with the exception of the initial year.  Magnitude Fatalities 
has a large impact on the results of the simulation, but is surpassed as the second greatest 
effector in 2014 by Additional Primary Teachers.  The variable with the next largest 
impact was Additional Secondary Teachers.  The smallest impact came from the 
Magnitude Fighting, although it was still statistically significant.  It should be recalled, 
however, that in this demonstration, data was limited and the modeling was restricted to a 
single facet of failing states.  Once the input variables were shown to have a significant 
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impact on net migration, the test scenarios developed in Chapter III were simulated with 
the model to determine which notional policies might have the greatest impact on net 
migration flow. 
Scenario Results 
 As described in Chapter III, eight hypothetical US policies were created and then 
simulated using the MMDRC.  The figures on net migration in this model are simply that; 
net migration without a distinction of who entered or left the DRC or why.  For the 
purpose of the demonstration analysis it is assumed that positive net migration 
(Immigration into the country) is desirable.  Clearly, if this inflow were refugees fleeing a 
neighboring warring state it would not be desirable.  However, positive net migration will 
be used for this demonstration.  The results of the simulation with regards to net 
migration are detailed in this section.  Table 16 shows the Net Migration Rate, in 
migrants per thousand per year, results for the first six years of the simulated scenarios. 
 The results listed in Table 16 show that scenario 8, which employs policies aimed 
at reducing violence, bolstering education, and creating jobs, has the largest favorable 
impact on net migration into the DRC.  These results show that there is an additive effect 
among the three notional policies of reducing violence, increasing education, and creating 
jobs, quelling the violence has the greatest effect throughout every year of the simulation.  
Its effect is larger than the combined effect of creating jobs and sending teachers to the 
country.  Sending primary and secondary teachers into the country initially has a very 
small impact, but its impact grows larger as time progresses and becomes the second 
most significant individual policy of net migration change.  Job creation is the second 
largest factor in the first several years of the simulation, but by 2016 it begins to have less 
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of an impact on migration than the education policy.  This is likely due to the diminishing 
impact of the creating a set number of jobs with an increasing population.  This policy 
suggests that job creation has an immediate effect as people tend to migrate towards 
countries where work is available. 
Table 16: Results of Net Migration Rate (Migrants per Thousand per Year) for Simulated 
Scenarios 
Scenario 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
1 
(Constant) 
-10.73 -6.72 -1.59 4.62 11.85 20.07 
2 
(Violence) 
-10.73 0.44 5.46 18.62 25.45 33.12 
3 
(Education) 
-10.73 -6.68 -1.28 5.44 13.18 21.83 
4  
(Jobs) 
-10.73 -5.56 0.31 6.45 13.5 21.43 
5 (3 & 4 
combined) 
-10.73 -5.51 0.61 7.27 14.83 23.19 
6 (2 & 3 
combined) 
-10.73 0.48 5.76 19.44 26.78 34.89 
7 (2 & 4 
combined) 
-10.73 1.61 7.35 20.44 27.09 34.48 
8 (1, 2, & 3 
combined) 
-10.73 1.65 7.65 21.26 28.42 36.25 
 
 Chapter V presented the results of a DOE used to measure the impact of input 
variables on the net migration rate into and out of the country.  In addition, this chapter 
presented the results of eight scenarios in which notional aid policies could be used to 
affect the net migration rate.  A word of caution must be presented here.  The model of 
net migration demonstrates that modeling can assist in evaluating policies in failing 
states.  However, it also helps to illustrate that the complex elements of nation building 
may not be successfully modeled in separation.  By focusing only on net migration, and 
not capturing additional interactions, MMDRC has limited value beyond demonstrating 
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the potential value of a more complex DRC model.  With a finer granularity of the 
elements of net migration, and interaction with economic, ethnic strife, internal 
migration, and so forth, compiled with sufficient data to support such a model, a more 
accurate and detailed analysis could be made.  MMDRC does, however, demonstrate the 
possibility.  Chapter VI will discuss the impact of this research and areas of interest for 
future research opportunities. 
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VI.  Conclusion 
 
 
 This chapter contains a summary of the research presented in this study.  
Additionally, recommendations for future uses of this study are put forth along with areas 
where future research could prove useful to the problem area. 
Research Summary 
 This thesis underscored the importance of bolstering weak and fragile states in 
order to prevent the societal calamities that accompany failed states.  In an effort to gain 
insight into policies that could alleviate demographic tension in a country caused by net 
migration, the Migration Model of the Democratic Republic of Congo (MMDRC) model 
was developed.  To develop the MMDRC, data concerning various aspects of the 
economic and educational attributes of the DRC were studied and regressed along with 
measurements of violent conflict in the country.  Operations research principles were 
utilized to construct a dynamic, time-continuous model which could be used to analyze 
the effects foreign aid policies have on the net migration rate of the DRC.  After the 
completion of the MMDRC, six scenarios were examined to determine the impact 
hypothetical foreign actions would have on the country. 
Research Findings 
 This research suggested that system dynamics could be useful in modeling 
complex human interactions, specifically migration flow.  Estimations of the impacts of 
future policies were able to be modeled to give insight into the future migration rate of 
the DRC. 
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 Analysis of the MMDRC showed that policies which establish peace in the DRC 
by reducing the number of deaths in the country have the largest effect on net migration.  
This finding supports the theory that armed conflict in a region deters migration into the 
area.  Additionally, the model indicated that job creation has a large impact in the first 
few forecasted years, but as time goes on, the number of teachers sent and trained 
becomes more significant.  This finding is of interest to decision makers as objectives 
that require rapid increases in the net migration would be best reached by creating jobs 
instead of sending educators, whereas longer term objectives for migration increase may 
best be served by sending teachers into the country. 
 The MMDRC does have a number of limitations.  While this pilot study does 
demonstrate the potential use of modeling to assess potential courses of action, it also 
highlights these limitations.  Scarcity of reliable data focused this study into modeling a 
single aspect of failing states, net migration.  The complexity of human interaction cannot 
be captured in a single key element.  This strongly suggests that future work balance the 
granularity required, the levels of complexity incorporated, and the data availability 
required to build supporting tools for nation building.  In addition, one must consider the 
question, or questions, to be addressed. 
Areas of Future Research 
 While this study analyzed an aspect of the armed conflicts occurring in the DRC, 
further study of these in relation to refugees could prove beneficial.  The armed conflict 
data used in the study was categorical and thus ill-suited for use in a dynamic model.  If 
continuous data regarding the armed conflict becomes available, incorporating fitted 
regression equations of the data into the MMDRC could provide more insight into how 
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violent conflict affects migration, as well as interactions between conflict and the 
economy and education level of the DRC. 
 While it is worthwhile to have an understanding of what drives people away from 
the DRC, or any country, it is also important to know the destination of migrants in order 
to assess the future stability of the receiving nations.  Research into where migrants from 
the DRC travel, as well as what draws migrants from other nations into the DRC could 
give insight into future nations, or areas, where instability could be a cause for concern. 
 It is recognized that migrants who cross international borders are not the only type 
of migrant of interest when studying nation instability.  Internally displaced persons can 
be an additional stressor on nation stability.  This is of particular concern in the DRC 
where there are numerous different ethnic groups in the country and a history of conflict 
between them.  Research into the tribal interactions within the DRC and how they drive 
conflict and corruption could prove particularly helpful in gaining insight into internal 
migration and internally displaced persons and the impact they have on international 
refugees and migration. 
Conclusions 
 The Democratic Republic of Congo is a country with a vast amount of economic 
potential; however, corrupt leadership and continual warfare has put the nation on the 
brink of collapse.  Understanding the role migration plays in the stability of the nation is 
vital to building sound foreign policies to mitigate the problems occurring in the DRC.  
To understand the many relationships and factors that affect net migration, it is important 
to have accurate models to represent the complexities of the problem.  The MMDRC uses 
system dynamics to model elements involved in predicting policy effects on the net 
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migration rate in the DRC.  It was used to show that foreign policies involving quelling 
armed conflict, job creation, and boosting education in the country had statistically 
significant impacts on migration in future years.  Critical to utilizing such modeling, 
however, will be the development of accurate longitudinal data on failed and failing 
states.  The exact conditions that exist in failing states often make accurate data difficult 
to obtain to support modeling.  Future research into the armed conflicts and internal 
migration of the DRC could provide even further insight into how the US could act to 
stabilize the DRC.  It is the sincere hope of this study that the model presented in this 
thesis will give insight into the complexities involved with modeling failing states and 
highlight the need for improved tools to aid decision makers in drafting policies that will 
speed the recovery and stabilization of failing states. 
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Appendix A: Model Variables and Sources 
 
Factor Symbol Description Source 
Population (Total) P Millions of people in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
WB 
Net Migration NM The number of people per million per year who enter 
(positive value) and leave (negative value) the DRC 
WB 
Unemployment U The percentage of the population 15+ who are 
unemployed in the DRC 
WB 
Change in 
Unemployment 
CU The change in the unemployment percentage in the 
DRC in a year 
WB 
Labor Force LF The number of people (in thousands), age 15+, who 
are employed in the DRC 
WB 
GNI per Capita GpC The Gross National Income (Purchasing Power Parity, 
or PPP) per capita in the DRC, measured in 2010 US$ 
WB 
Education Index E 0 to 1 value used by the UN to represent educational 
opportunity and expectations in the DRC 
UNDP 
GNI GNI The Gross National Income (PPP) of the DRC 
measured in millions of 2010 US$ 
WB 
Birth Rate BR Number of live births per thousand per year in the 
DRC 
WB 
Death Rate DR Number of deaths per thousand per year in the DRC WB 
Primary Students 
per Teacher 
PSpT The number of primary students per primary teacher 
in the DRC 
WB 
Primary Pupils PP Number of primary students in the DRC measured in 
thousands 
WB 
Primary Teachers PT Number of primary teachers in the DRC measured in 
thousands 
WB 
Change in Primary 
Teachers 
CPT The increase or decrease in the number of primary 
teachers in the DRC, in thousands per year 
WB 
Secondary Students 
per Teacher 
SSpT The number of secondary students per secondary 
teacher in the DRC 
WB 
Secondary Pupils SP Number of secondary students in the DRC measured 
in thousands 
WB 
Secondary Teachers ST Number of secondary teachers in the DRC measured 
in thousands 
WB 
Change in 
Secondary Teachers 
CST The increase or decrease in the number of secondary 
teachers in the DRC, in thousands per year 
WB 
Refugees Out RO The number of people from the DRC, in thousands, 
who are refugees or in refugee-like situations living 
outside the DRC 
UNHCR 
WB: The World Bank ( http://data.worldbank.org/indicator ) 
UNDP: The United Nations Development Program (http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/tables/default.html) 
UNHCR: The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(http://apps.who.int/globalatlas/DataQuery/default.asp) 
PITF: Political Instability Task Force (http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm)  
USCB: United States Census Bureau International Database 
(http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/country.php) 
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Factor Symbol Description Source 
15+ Population PW The percentage of people over the age of 15 in 
the DRC 
WB* 
Life Expectancy LE The life expectancy at birth for the DRC USCB* 
Magnitude Fighting MFi A dummy variable, 0-4, that represents the 
number of combatants or activists 
participating in an uprising 
PITF** 
Magnitude 
Fatalities 
MFa A dummy variable, 0-4, that represents the 
number of deaths caused by a conflict 
PITF** 
Magnitude Area MA A dummy variable, 0-4, that represents the 
land area size where the conflict is occurring 
PITF** 
Jobs Created JC The number of jobs (thousands) created in the 
DRC by US policies 
N/A*** 
Additional Primary 
Teachers 
APT The number of primary teachers (thousands) 
created in the DRC by US policies 
N/A*** 
Additional 
Secondary Teachers 
AST The number of secondary teachers (thousands) 
created in the DRC by US policies 
N/A*** 
*     These variables were used in the model regression and are not altered in the 
scenarios 
**   These variables were used in the model regression and are altered in the scenarios 
*** These variables were not used in the model regression and are altered in the 
scenarios 
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Appendix B: Diagram of the Migration Model of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(MMDRC) 
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Appendix C: Design of Experiments Run Parameters 
Run 
Number 
Magnitude 
Fighting 
Magnitude 
Fatalities 
Jobs 
Created 
Additional 
Primary Teachers 
Additional 
Secondary Teachers 
1 1 3 0 5.15 0 
2 0 0 0 5.15 3.09 
3 4 4 70 0 0 
4 2 2 0 5.15 0 
5 0 1 70 5.15 0 
6 4 1 0 5.15 0 
7 0 2 70 0 0 
8 1 4 0 0 0 
9 2 0 70 0 0 
10 2 1 0 0 3.09 
11 0 3 0 0 3.09 
12 4 0 0 0 3.09 
13 1 1 70 0 3.09 
14 3 4 0 5.15 3.09 
15 1 2 70 5.15 3.09 
16 2 4 70 5.15 3.09 
17 3 2 0 0 3.09 
18 4 3 70 5.15 3.09 
19 3 0 70 5.15 0 
20 3 3 70 0 0 
21 0 0 35 2.575 1.545 
22 0 1 35 2.575 1.545 
23 0 2 35 2.575 1.545 
24 0 3 35 2.575 1.545 
25 0 4 35 2.575 1.545 
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Appendix D: Blue Dart 
Why Are You Leaving? 
 Imagine you live in a country where armed insurgent and government troops 
ravage and pillage local villages, one in three people are out of work, nearly half of all 
women are unable to read, and the average person lives on less than two dollars a day.  
Now ask yourself, “What would take to get me to stay here instead of running for the 
nearest national border?”  While you may never be faced with this situation in your own 
lifetime, it is a stark reality for the citizens of one of Africa’s most populated nations, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
 International migration is a source of tension between nations, as well as the 
citizens of the host country.  This becomes obvious by a quick examination of recent 
migration issues throughout the world.  As migrants move into a host country, they can 
place added stress on host country resources, as well as disrupting the political status quo 
in the region where they settle.  In 1996, the large migration into the DRC of Hutu 
tribesmen fleeing retribution for the Rwandan genocide played a large part in the toppling 
of the regime which had controlled the DRC for the past 30 years.  While most of the 
Rwandan refugees were repatriated after a couple of years, eastern DRC continues to 
suffer from chronic human rights violations, poverty, and instability. 
 It is important for US foreign policy decision makers to understand what causes 
migration in a country.  This knowledge could then be used to inform decisions that will 
affect migration and nation stability.  While it is recognized that each situation is 
different, there are common themes in the reasons people give for leaving their homes.  
The Migration Model of the Democratic Republic of Congo (MMDRC), developed by 
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Capt. Michael  Thompson at the Air Force Institute of Technology, examines three of 
these common themes:  violence, employment, and education. 
 Findings of the MMDRC indicate that decreasing the levels of violence in the 
DRC would have the greatest impact on creating favorable net migration in the DRC, 
with education and jobs having a lesser, though still positive effect.  However, the model 
highlights the need for reliable data concerning failing states.  This lack of accurate, 
longitudinal data is an inhibitor to any study on courses of action to promote nation 
stability in the DRC, or other failing states.  Additionally, Capt Thompson’s research 
shows that decisions should not be based solely on the number of migrants entering and 
leaving a country.  The attributes of the individual migrants are important to know.  Are 
the people coming in to a country trained professionals making a voluntary choice to 
move, or are they poverty stricken villagers who were forced out of their previous home 
at gun point?  Unfortunately this information is unavailable. 
 Migration is a complex issue and is a part of the even more complex problem of 
nation stability.  These complexities make decisions solely targeted to a single element of 
state failure inappropriate, as important relationships will be removed.  State failure is a 
problem that needs to be examined in its entirety; in order to accomplish that additional 
research needs to be conducted and data gathered to accurately represent the nations and 
regions involved. 
 - Captain Michael Thompson is a graduate student at the Air Force Institute of 
Technology at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. 
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